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Abstract
This paper explores the determinants of firm survival in export markets. We build an exporter dynamics
model where firms need to pay market-specific sunk and fixed costs to operate abroad and where firm export
profitability in each foreign market follows a geometric Brownian motion. Firms also differ ex ante by a
constant market-specific profitability shifter. We derive the probability of export survival upon entry in a
market and show that it increases with the ratio of sunk to fixed costs and is insensitive to the profitability
shifters. Also, we show that the survival probability is unaffected by fixed costs if sunk costs are zero. We
take the model to the data using firm-level Argentine export information. We find that survival rates decrease
with distance, which the model rationalizes with sunk costs that increase with distance proportionally less
than fixed costs. Estimated sunk costs are small. In fact, a counterfactual exercise shows that removing
those costs increases aggregate exports by less than 1.5%. Finally, we also find that survival increases with
a firm’s export experience. Analogously to distance, the model’s implication of this empirical result is that
experience reduces sunk costs proportionally less than fixed costs.
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1 Introduction
A substantial fraction of aggregate exports is explained by new exporters (Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout,
2008; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2009; Lawless, 2009). Using our dataset of Argentine firms, we
find that 42% of aggregate exports in 2006 are explained by either new exporters or old exporters entering
new destinations after 1996. Similarly, Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2008) find that new exporters
explain about 50% of export growth in Colombia between 1996 and 2005. New exporters tend to start small
and focus on a single, usually neighboring, country. Once they outlive their entry year, they tend to expand
their sales abroad and reach a larger number of destinations (Albornoz, Calvo Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas,
2012; Lawless, 2009; Buono, Fadinger, and Aeberhardt, 2014). The occurrence of this process, however, is
not guaranteed. Both new exporters and exporters entering new markets exhibit high rates of failure in
their exporting activity. Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout (2008) show that about half of new exporters
discontinue their exporting activity within the first year. For Argentine firms, we find a survival rate of 31%
after two years for exporters - new or old - entering a new export destination. This body of evidence suggests
the importance of understanding the determinants of export survival. This paper aims to contribute to this
understanding.
A standard framework to analyze exporter dynamics consists of three key elements: (a) a firm-specific
productivity process; (b) fixed export costs; and (c) sunk export costs. This framework is widely used in
theoretical (e.g. Arkolakis (Forthcoming) and Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and Opromolla (2013)) and empirical
(e.g. Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) and Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014)) studies. Confined to this
standard framework, we derive theoretical implications for the probability of firm survival upon entry in
a new market. We show that this probability increases with the ratio of sunk costs to fixed costs and is
insensitive to firm- and market-specific profitability shifters. Also, we show that this probability is unaffected
by fixed costs if sunk costs are zero. Based on these results, we use observed patterns of survival among
Argentine exporters to estimate the relative magnitude of sunk to fixed costs and its relationship with
distance (to the destination country) and firm’s export experience. Observed survival rates decrease with
distance and increase with export experience. Thus, combined with our theoretical results, these facts imply
that fixed costs increase with distance and decrease with export experience proportionally more than sunk
costs. They also imply that sunk costs are not negligible as they are key to explain observed variation in
survival rates across destinations and types of export experience. Nevertheless, simulation results with the
calibrated model indicate that sunk costs have a very small impact on aggregate exports.
We model firms whose export profitability in each foreign market follows an idiosyncratic and market-
specific geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process. While the parameters that govern this process are
common across firms and markets, variation in export profitability is also determined by a set of idiosyncratic
and market-specific constant profitability shifters capturing, for instance, idiosyncratic demand components.
Entering each market imposes paying sunk costs that are common to all firms. In addition, firms need to pay
market-specific fixed costs - also common to all firms - while they operate in that market. Once a firm has
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entered a market by paying the sunk costs it can suspend operations and avoid fixed costs until it decides
to operate again. Thus, there is no need to repay sunk costs to resume operations. In this environment,
we derive the probability of survival upon entry in a foreign market and perform comparative statics with
respect to sunk costs, fixed costs, and the idiosyncratic profitability parameter. A key finding is that a
higher ex-ante ability to make profits in a specific market - governed by the constant profitability parameter
- is compensated with a lower entry and exit threshold for the GBM profitability process. In other words,
firms undo their static advantages in a given market by entering sooner. This finding is critical to obtain
model predictions amenable for empirical estimation. It implies that the probability of survival is equal for
all firms that enter a given market and depends only on the ratio of sunk to fixed costs. Specifically, the
higher is this ratio the higher is also the probability of survival. However, if sunk costs are zero, the survival
probability is insensitive to variation in fixed costs.
A direct test of the model’s predictions would require exploiting variation across countries in sunk and
fixed costs. Unfortunately, it is not easy to find independent proxies for both types of costs. The main
reason is that sunk costs usually involve upfront activities that have to be repeated as a fixed cost every year
after entering a new export market. For example, establishing distribution channels or adapting products
to the idiosyncratic characteristics of local demand have a sunk cost component. Still, these costs are also
fixed in the sense that distribution channels have to be maintained while adapting products to an evolving
environment is a continuous process that requires sustained business services over time. Thus, observable
variables that can proxy for one type of cost also proxy for the other. In particular, this is the case for
distance (as other gravity variables) and export experience. As a result, the effect of these variables on
survival probabilities can only inform us about the relative importance of both types of export costs.
Using Argentine firm-level customs data, we find that survival rates decrease with the distance to the
destination country.1 Through the lenses of the standard framework we use, this finding implies that the
ratio of sunk to fixed costs also falls with distance. We parametrize this relationship and estimate it using the
model. The main result of this exercise is that the magnitude of the ratio of sunk to fixed costs is strikingly
small, ranging from 0.1 to 0 for short and long distance destinations, respectively. We also simulate the
model to assess its quantitative implications. First, we quantify new exporters’ contribution to exports in a
given market. The model performs well at short horizons but overpredicts this contribution at long horizons.
Second, by conducting counterfactual analysis, we find that while variation across countries in the relative
magnitude of sunk to fixed costs is necessary to explain the observed cross-country variation in survival
rates, the impact of sunk costs on aggregate exports is still small. In fact, similarly to Alessandria and Choi
(2007), our counterfactual exercise indicates that completely removing those costs only has a negligible effect
(at most 1.5%) on aggregate exports.
A firm’s export experience can also proxy for sunk and fixed costs. Since an experienced firm should face
lower sunk and fixed costs, the impact of experience on both types of costs, like the impact of distance, should
1In our empirical section, we find that survival rates also decrease when countries do not share a common language, which
is another (non-geographical) measure of distance.
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induce opposite effects on the survival probability. Nevertheless, the analysis in this case is complicated by
the fact that once experience in one market is allowed to affect sunk and fixed costs in another, entry
decisions across markets become interdependent. Therefore, to study the effect of experience we extend the
baseline model to allow export decisions to be interdependent across markets. In particular, we allow sunk
and fixed costs to be lower for an “experienced” firm, where the relevant experience can come from previous
exports to any other country or, in the spirit of Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014)’s “extended gravity”,
from previous exports only to related countries (e.g. by geographical proximity or a common language).
We derive and compare the probability of survival upon entry for experienced and inexperienced firms. If
experience only lowers sunk costs, then the model predicts experience to reduce the survival probability upon
entry. If, conversely, experience only reduces fixed cost, the result is ambiguous in general although under
a “regular” case it predicts experience to raise the probability of survival. When we estimate the effect of
export experience on firm survival, we find that different forms of experience, including those captured by
the extended gravities, raise the probability of surviving in a new export market. Hence, this finding implies
that the impact of experience on fixed costs dominates its impact on sunk costs. This finding contrasts with
Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014), where export experience in extended gravity markets affects exclusively
the magnitude of sunk costs. If that were the case, we should observe survival rates decreasing with a firm’s
export experience.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to a literature that attempts to
obtain quantitative estimates of sunk and fixed exporting costs. Since the early work of Baldwin (1988);
Krugman (1989); Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989), the export dynamics literature has un-
derscored the importance of sunk and fixed costs to explain entry and exit in export markets. The effect of
these costs on firm’s exporting activity was initially estimated by Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard
and Jensen (2004). More recently, quantifying these costs has become one of the most important challenges
in this literature. For example, Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) find that sunk costs are substantial, about
US$ 400,000 for Colombian firms in different industries, but fixed costs are negligible. More recently, Morales,
Sheu, and Zahler (2014) emphasize that fixed and sunk costs vary across destinations. They also contend
that a firm’s previous exporting experience reduces the sunk costs of entering a new destination. Their esti-
mates for Chilean chemical exporters indicate that sunk costs may be above US$ 100,000 but fixed costs are
below US$ 11,000. Overall, this recent quantitative research suggests that sunk costs are substantially larger
than fixed costs. Using a theoretical framework largely consistent with the framework used in that literature,
we derive theoretical results on survival probabilities that, combined with observed survival rates, impose
restrictions on how the relative magnitude of these costs vary with distance and experience. Interestingly,
some of the estimates in the literature do not satisfy those restrictions and hence should be reconsidered in
light of these new results. Furthermore, our estimates indicate the opposite: fixed costs are substantially
larger than sunk costs. Since our implications are dependent on the standard framework we use to derive
them, alternative explanations of the empirical findings could be obtained by extending the framework in
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various possible directions such as introducing uncertainty about market-specific demand (Albornoz, Calvo
Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas, 2012; Eaton, Eslava, Jinkins, Krizan, and Tybout, 2014; Fanelli and Hallak,
2015), network formation (Chaney, 2014), or reputation (Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas, 2014).
Our paper also contributes to an incipient literature on exporter dynamics primarily interested in ex-
plaining the size distribution of firms in an open economy. Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and Opromolla (2013)
use a framework similar to the one developed in this paper to study the decision to enter and exit a foreign
market in a two-country framework. They show that the survival probability (i.e. the band of inaction)
increases with sunk costs and decreases with fixed costs. Arkolakis (Forthcoming) extends the standard
framework with market penetration costs but assumes away sunk costs to develop a general equilibrium
model of industry and exporter dynamics. Compared to these papers, our main contribution is to combine
theoretical and empirical results on survival probabilities to infer how geography and export history affect
the relative magnitude of sunk and fixed costs.
Variation in survival rates could potentially be explained as the result of different export entry technolo-
gies. Blum, Claro, and Horstmann (2013) distinguish between perennial and occasional exporters and argue
that capacity constraints explain their different survival performance. Specifically, occasional exporters serve
foreign markets sporadically as a way to use existing capacity in the face of negative demand shocks in the
domestic market. Although they abstract from destinations and experience, their model could potentially
match our facts provided that this type of occasional exporters is less prevalent among proximate markets
and experienced firms. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence suggesting that this could be the
case. More closely related to our paper, Be´ke´s and Murako¨zy (2012) also document survival rates decreasing
in distance and build a three-period model to explain this fact. In their model, firms can pay a sunk cost
to reduce variable trade costs, in which case the survival probability increases. A key assumption is that
the decision to undertake this investment is made in period 1 (the beginning of times) when firms draw
their productivity from an exogenous distribution. Conditional on this productivity, firms encounter more
incentives to pay higher sunk costs in proximate markets because profits are higher due to lower variable
trade costs. By contrast, in our model firms are not imposed an exogenous instant for assessing whether they
wish to enter a new export market. As a result, at the time of entry profits need not be higher in proximate
markets. In fact, one of our main results indicates that firms will enter sooner precisely in those markets,
fully compensating the ceteris paribus higher market-specific profitability.
Other papers have previously documented the effect of experience on export survival. For example,
Carre`re and Strauss-Kahn (2014) provide evidence, albeit at the product level, that the export experience
of non-OECD countries increases the survival of new exports to the OECD. Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas
(2014) find that experience raises the probability of survival at the firm level, and offer an explanation based
on reputation. In their model, contracts are not perfectly enforceable and exporters may be defaulted by
their distributors. Experience in similar markets help exporters identify partners who will not default and
therefore allow their export incursions to survive longer. While we explain the effect of experience within
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the limits of a model in which contracts are perfect, we see both explanations as complementary.
Finally, some empirical papers uncover additional determinants of exporter survival. For example, in a
panel of Hungarian exporters Go¨rg, Kneller, and Murako¨zy (2012) find that firm productivity is positively
related to the duration of a new export experience. They also find that multi-product exporters are relatively
more successful in exporting their core product. Cadot, Iacovone, and Rauch (2013), using customs data
from Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Tanzania, find that the survival rates upon entry in a new market increase
with the number of competitors from the same country already serving that market. While these are
valuable findings, we restrict ourselves to the simplest possible benchmark we can use to focus on the main
determinants of exporter survival.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we set up the model in the case of independent
markets and derive predictions about variation in survival probabilities across destination countries. In
section 3, we estimate in a reduced form the effect of distance and other gravity variables on survival rates.
In section 4, we structurally estimate the model and conduct counterfactual experiments. In section 5,
we develop the case of interdependent markets and derive predictions on survival probabilities by export
experience. In section 6, we estimate the effect of different forms of experience on survival rates. The last
section presents concluding remarks.
2 Determinants of exporter survival (I): Independent markets
In this section, we develop a theoretical model to study exporter survival. We analyze the problem of a firm
that has to decide whether and when to enter a foreign market. In section 2.1, we describe the setup of the
model. In section 2.2, we find the optimal entry threshold θ∗k in market k. In section 2.3, we derive the
probability of survival upon entry and perform comparative statistics on parameters that vary across firms
and markets. Here, we focus on the case in which the entry decision is independent across markets. Specific
cases of interdependence are analyzed in section 4.
2.1 Setup
A firm is characterized by a time-varying profitability parameter θkt and a constant profitability shifter
ψk for each of K foreign markets. These parameters determine the firm’s operating profits conditional on
exporting, pikt = ψkθkt. The firm-specific profitability shifters ψk capture ex-ante differences, such as the
firms’ ability to match idiosyncratic tastes or their overall productivity, while θkt reflects productivity or
demand shocks. Following Luttmer (2007), Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and Opromolla (2013), and Arkolakis
(Forthcoming), we assume that the profitability parameter θkt follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dθkt = αθktdt+ σθktdzt; θ0 given
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where α and σ are, respectively, the drift and volatility parameters, and zt is a standard Brownian motion.
Firms are risk-neutral and have a constant discount factor υ. We assume υ > α to ensure that expected
discounted profits are bounded. We allow the {θkt} processes to be correlated across markets.2 For example,
{θkt} could be the combination of a productivity process {ϕt} common to all markets and a demand process
{λkt} independent across markets.3
Each foreign market is characterized by the parameters Sk and Fk. To enter an export market, the firm
must pay a sunk cost given by Sk. Also, exporting to market k entails paying fixed costs Fk on a continuous
basis while the firm is exporting. Sunk costs are typically assumed by the literature to include activities
such as setting up a distribution network, learning foreign regulations, and undertaking marketing efforts to
establish a product or brand in the market. However, as we argue in section 3, those activities also require
continuous maintenance. Analogously, most activities that involve fixed costs have an irreversible component
which can be considered a sunk cost. Given the conceptual difficulty in distinguishing activities that are
either sunk or fixed costs, we propose to interpret these costs as follows. Think of Sk as the investment a
firm needs to make in a variety of activities when it first enters market k to achieve a certain stock that needs
to be maintained. This stock depreciates at rate δk. Therefore, to maintain the initial stock and be able to
keep its exporting status, the firm needs to pay Fk = δkSkdt per unit of time. In this section, we assume
that both Sk and Fk are independent across markets. Section 4 will consider cases of interdependence.
Finally, we assume that whenever pikt < Fk, the firm can suspend its activity in market k without cost
and resume it when conditions improve without having to repay the sunk cost Sk. Hence, after entering
market k, the firm is forever entitled to the flow of net profits Πkt = max {pikt − Fk, 0}.4 This assumption is
consistent with the pervasiveness of re-entry in export markets (see Fanelli and Hallak, 2015). Nevertheless,
as we discuss later, our main results hold even if Sk needs to be repaid at the beginning of each export spell.
2.2 Solving for the entry threshold θ∗k
Formally, the entry problem of the firm is a standard “optimal stopping” problem in a context of investment
under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). There are three possible states of the firm regarding its activity
in market k. The firm is “inside” market k if it has paid the sunk cost Sk and it is “outside” market k
otherwise. In turn, an inside firm can be “active” if it is currently operating in the market (pikt ≥ Fk) or
“inactive” otherwise (pikt < Fk). At every instant while the firm is outside market k, it must decide whether
to continue in its current state or pay the sunk cost to enter this market. The solution to this entry problem
is characterized by a unique threshold value θ∗k such that the firm stays outside market k if θkt ∈ [0, θ∗k) and
enters this market if θkt ∈ [θ∗k,∞).
2The fact that θ0 is common across markets and firms is wlog because of the presence of ψk. Equivalently, we could set
ψk ≡ 1 and allow the initial value θk0 to differ across firms and markets.
3Luttmer (2007) shows that θkt can be microfounded as a combination of demand and productivity shocks that follow a
multivariate GBM in a stationary monopolistic-competition environment with CES preferences.
4Note that under our suggested interpretation of fixed and sunk costs there is no depreciation of the investment if the firm
does not export.
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Let V0k(θkt) denote the value of an outside firm and V1k(θkt) denote the value of an inside firm. Using
standard results of GBMs, we obtain5
V0k(θkt) = A0kθ
β1
kt
V1k(θkt) =
 A1k(ψkθkt)β2 +
ψkθkt
υ−α − Fkυ if θkt ≥ Fkψk
B1k(ψkθkt)
β1 if θkt <
Fk
ψk

where
β1,2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
±
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2υ
σ2
,
A1k and B1k are positive constants, and A0k is an unknown constant.
Since θkt follows a diffusion, the solution must satisfy a value-matching and a smooth-pasting condition
at the threshold θ∗k,
V0k(θ
∗
k) = V1k(θ
∗
k)− Sk
dV0k(θkt)
dθkt
|θ∗k =
dV1k(θkt)
dθkt
|θ∗k .
Define “normalized” profitability as θ˜kt ≡ ψkθktFk and the “normalized” entry threshold as θ˜∗k ≡
ψkθ
∗
k
Fk
. In our
particular setting, these conditions lead to the following equation,
(
β1
υ
− β1 − 1
υ − α
)
θ˜∗β2k +
(β1 − 1)
υ − α θ˜
∗
k − β1
(
1
υ
+
Sk
Fk
)
= 0. (1)
The only unknown in this equation is θ˜∗k. While we cannot solve for θ˜
∗
k in closed form, the following lemma
will help us characterize key features of the implicit solution.
Lemma 1. Let Gk(θ˜k) be the left-hand-side of equation (1). Then, there is a unique θ˜
∗
k ∈ [1,∞) such
that Gk(θ˜
∗
k) = 0. Furthermore, G
′
k(θ˜
∗
k) ≥ 0, with strict inequality if θ˜∗k > 1. Finally, θ˜∗k = 1 iff Sk = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Note that since SkFk is common across firms, so is θ˜
∗
k. Hence, the (un-normalized) entry threshold θ
∗
k is
firm-specific and directly proportional to the demand shifter, ψk, and to the inverse of fixed costs, F
−1
k . In
other words, firms with higher ψk have a lower θ
∗
k and, hence, will be more likely to enter market k. Note,
however, that as long as the {θkt} processes are not perfectly correlated across markets, a firm’s market
entry sequence is not predetermined.
2.3 The probability of survival
We define the probability of survival Pk(T ) as the probability that a firm entering market k at time τ is still
active in that market at time τ + T . As an initial condition, we assume all firms are born with an initial
5We provide detailed derivations in Online Appendix 1, available from the authors’ websites.
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value θ0 that is lower than θ
∗
k.
6 Therefore, the continuity of the process for θkt ensures that all firms enter
market k with θkt = θ
∗
k. In turn, they exit (possibly temporarily) whenever operating profits pikt fall below
Fk, which occurs at θkt =
Fk
ψk
.
The survival probability Pk(T ) can be written as:
Pk(T ) = P
(
θk,τ+T >
Fk
ψk
∣∣∣∣
θkτ=θ∗k
)
.
Since θkt is a GBM with parameters α and σ, ln θkt is a standard Brownian motion with drift µ = α− 12σ2
and volatility σ. Hence, the distribution of ln (θk,τ+T ) conditional on ln(θkτ ) is normally distributed with
mean ln(θ∗k) + µT and variance σ
2T . Pk(T ) can be computed as:
Pk(T ) = 1− Φ
(
ln( Fkψkθ∗k
)− µT
σ
√
T
)
. (2)
Equation (2) displays a closed form solution for the survival probability in market k as a function of
model parameters and the endogenous entry threshold θ∗k. All model parameters except for the market-
specific shifter ψk are common across firms. Those parameters include the sunk cost (Sk), the fixed cost
(Fk), and the parameters of the general profitability process (α and σ). Therefore, only differences in ψk, and
those they induce on θ∗k, could potentially generate variation across firms in survival probabilities. However,
as we show next, Pk(T ) does not depend on ψk. As a result, this probability is the same for all firms upon
entry into market k.
Proposition 1. Pk(T ) is independent of ψk.
Proof.
Using our definition of θ˜kt, we can rewrite (2) as:
Pk(T ) = Φ
(
ln θ˜∗k + µT
σ
√
T
)
. (3)
Lemma 1 established that θ˜∗k is common to all firms. Therefore, (3) establishes that the probability of
survival in market k is also common to all firms. QED
Proposition 1 provides a “neutrality” result. This result is critical for our empirical analysis. It implies
that the probability of survival does not depend on the unobserved value of the heterogeneous parameter
ψk and hence is common to all firms entering market k. This probability will vary across markets solely
as a function of Sk and Fk. An implication of this result is that the model does not need to impose any
restriction on the distribution of ψk across firms or markets.
6Assuming ψdθ0
Fd
> 1 and Sd = 0 firms serve their domestic market first (d = domestic).
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The probability of survival is unaffected by ψk because this parameter induces inversely proportional
changes in the entry and exit thresholds, compensating each other’s effect on this probability. The intuition
is simple. Suppose that market k is ex-ante more appealing ceteris paribus for firm 1 than for firm 2
(ψk1 > ψk2). Then, firm 1’s entry threshold will be lower and the firm will be more likely to enter that
market sooner. However, it will also exit with a proportionally lower threshold. Since entry and exit
thresholds decrease proportionally with ψk, the probability of survival does not change. Note that this
result implies that profitability differences across markets that are general to all firms will not have any
effect on survival rates either. For example, market k may be more profitable than market k′ for all firms
because it is larger or geographically more proximate. Nevertheless, since entry and exit thresholds will be
(proportionally) lower, this fact will not generate different survival probabilities in the two markets.
The second proposition relates the probability of survival to the relative size of sunk and fixed costs:
Proposition 2. Pk(T ) is increasing in the ratio of sunk to fixed costs
Sk
Fk
. If Sk = 0, then Pk(T ) is
invariant to the size of fixed costs.
Proof.
From the definition of G, it is immediate that ∂Gk(θ˜k)∂(Sk/Fk) < 0. If Sk > 0, by Lemma 1 we also know that
∂Gk(θ˜k)
∂θ˜
> 0. Hence, applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
∂θ˜∗k
∂(Sk/Fk)
> 0. Since Pk is increasing
in θ˜∗k (equation 2), we obtain that
∂P (θ˜∗k(Sk/Fk))
∂(Sk/Fk)
> 0.
If Sk = 0, then θ˜
∗
k = 1 regardless of the level of Fk. Since θ˜
∗
k is a sufficient statistic for Pk(T ), this
probability will also be invariant to Fk. QED
Proposition 2 establishes that the probability of survival will be higher in markets where sunk costs are
larger relative to fixed costs. To understand this result further, note that the normalized entry threshold
(θ˜∗k ≡ ψkθ
∗
k
Fk
) is a measure of entry profits relative to fixed costs. Hence, in markets with higher SkFk firms
will require higher expected profitability relative to fixed costs to enter. Thus, they will enter those markets
with a higher value of θ˜k and as a result will survive longer. A trivial corollary of this result is that Pk(T )
increases with Sk conditional on Fk while it decreases with Fk conditional on Sk.
In case Sk and Fk change proportionally, the (unnormalized) entry threshold changes in the same propor-
tion, leaving Pk(T ) unaltered. Given that θkt is a GBM, expected profits at the new threshold will increase
in the same proportion as Sk, maintaining the balance between the costs and benefits of entry. Finally, if
Sk = 0, the level of fixed costs does not matter. In that case, since there is no value of waiting, the entry
threshold is equal to the exit threshold. Therefore, the probability of survival is just determined by the
probability that a GBM that passes a given point at time τ remains above that point at time T + τ . That
probability does not depend on the particular entry/exit point.
The fact that firms can costlessly exit and re-enter markets is not essential for the results. In the Online
Appendix 2, we solve the model under the alternative assumption that sunk costs must be paid at the
beginning of each export spell as in Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007). On the contrary, the fact that the
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profitability process following a GBM and that the market-specific profitability shifters are multiplicative are
necessary for the sharp results of propositions 1 and 2. However, these assumptions are useful to generate a
clean benchmark for understanding how survival probabilities are determined. While more general stochastic
processes or demand structures might induce deviations from this benchmark, the direction in which alternate
assumptions might affect these results is not obvious. In any event, the result that the probability of survival
increases with sunk costs holds with minimal assumptions on the stochastic process for profitability.7
3 Empirical analysis (I): Independent markets
To empirically assess the predictions of the model, we exploit firm-level customs data on the universe of
Argentine export transactions during the period 1994-2006. We start by describing the data (section 3.1)
and establishing some basic facts about export survival of Argentine firms (section 3.2). The econometric
analysis of the predictions obtained under the case of independent markets are discussed in section 3.3.
3.1 Data
The primary source of information of our dataset is Argentine customs data (ACD). Our dataset covers
firm-level exports of all Argentine firms (including agriculture). Each record corresponds to a firm’s unique
10-digit tax code (national identification tax number, CUIT); the exported good identified at the 12-digit
level NCM (Nomenclador Comu´n del Mercosur); the destination country; and the value exported in a given
year. The dataset spans from 1994 to 2006. Data on geographical distance and other gravity variables come
from the CEPII Gravity Dataset. This dataset includes measures of bilateral distances (in kilometers), GDP,
population, and whether a country pair shares a border or an official language.
Before turning to the descriptive statistics, we introduce the following terminology. First, we denote an
“incursion” as a firm’s first entry in a given destination market (i.e. re-entering a market previously served
is not considered an incursion). Second, “export survival” indicates whether the firm exports two years after
the incursion.8
3.2 Facts about Argentine exports and export survival
During the period of our study, Argentine exports experienced steady growth from 1994 to 1998, and became
anemic from 1999 to the economic collapse of 2001. Following the dramatic currency devaluation of early
2002 (more than 140% in the first quarter of 2002), Argentine exports boomed, increasing more than 80%
between 2002 and 2006. Figure 1 displays this evolution. We also note a similar trend for manufacturing
goods (Harmonized System two-digit categories greater than 27) and differentiated goods (defined according
7The required assumption is that the process satisfies first-order-stochastic dominance, i.e. if θ′t > θt then Pr(θt+dt ≥ x|θ′t) >
Pr(θt+dt ≥ x|θt).
8Note that we do not impose consecutive exports in our definition of export survival. Alternative measures of survival will
be used to check the robustness of our results.
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to Rauch (1999)).
Figure 1: Argentine Exports (1994 - 2006)
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Table 1 provides basic information about exports from Argentina. The value of exports almost tripled
during the period, whereas the number of firms selling abroad increased by about 50%; from 9559 exporting
firms in 1994 to 14960 in 2006. The number of incursions per year followed a u-shaped trajectory. First,
we observe a peak of 13955 incursions in 1995. Then, we see a steady fall in incursions until reaching a
minimum in 2001 (9022). After the 2002 currency devaluation, the number of incursions resumed growth to
reach 13684 incursions in 2004. Incursions involved average sales of about US$ 12000, exhibiting a decreasing
trend over time (the geometric mean of sales per incursion rages from US$ 22136 in 1995 to US$ 7899 in
2003). Finally, the last column reports the survival rate, that is the fraction of surviving incursions. This
fraction is generally low (around 31%) and it is slightly higher during 1995, 1996, and the years after the
2002 currency devaluation. We note that both the number of incursions and the survival rates might be
overestimated in 1995 and 1996 by our inability to exclude re-entrants with export activity previous to 1994
and the fact that re-entrants tend to survive more.9
9We deal with this issue later with a robustness exercise where we focus on incursions to destinations for which we are certain
that the firm did not export for at least the previous 4 years.
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Table 1: Argentine Exports, 1994-2006
Year Export Value # Firms # Incursions Sales per incursion Rate of survival
(millions US$) (geometric mean) upon entry
1994 15800 9559
1995 20900 11025 13955 22136 0.34
1996 23800 11376 11816 19045 0.31
1997 26200 12107 11772 16281 0.28
1998 26200 12583 11931 8506 0.27
1999 23400 11818 10254 9833 0.28
2000 26400 11433 9239 9373 0.29
2001 27000 11217 9022 10818 0.30
2002 25500 12753 13219 8400 0.31
2003 29300 13602 13962 7899 0.33
2004 34200 13992 13684 9321 0.33
2005 39400 14668
2006 46000 14960
Total: Average: Total: Average: Average:
364100 12392 118854 12161 0.31
3.3 Empirical analysis
Proposition 2 states that the probability of survival increases with the ratio SkFk . Ideally, we would like to
have good measures of Sk and Fk to test whether survival rates upon entry are higher in markets with
higher SkFk . However, neither Sk nor Fk are observable. Furthermore, we cannot find a set of proxies that
we can distinctively associate with each of these two variables because both types of costs are incurred on
similar activities. To see this, consider the activities typically thought of as sunk costs by the literature.
They involve, for example, establishing distribution channels, designing marketing strategies, complying
with local regulations, learning about exporting procedures, and adapting to the institutional and cultural
characteristics of destination countries. While these activities have an upfront component and hence are
justifiably associated with sunk costs, they also need to be conducted repeatedly after the initial investment.
Thus, they are also a fixed cost. For example, distribution networks have to be maintained over time,
learning and adapting to an evolving environment is usually done on a continuous basis, and knowledge
about regulations has to be regularly updated.
Since we cannot find variables that convincingly proxy for SkFk , we cannot perform a test of Proposition
2. However, by exploiting the observed variation in survival rates across markets at different distances,
we can use this proposition to infer how SkFk varies.
10 While this ratio will be the focus of our empirical
analysis, as a preliminary step to help interpret the results, we present some evidence suggesting that the
absolute magnitudes of these exporing costs increase with distance. In the model, exit thresholds, which are
in terms of profits, are proportional to fixed costs. Under CES preferences, this translates into an observable
10We note that since we are only using exports from one country, we cannot rule out that omitted factors that are correlated
with Argentina’s bilateral distances also affect the results.
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implication: sales of exiting firms have to be larger the higher are the fixed costs. Specifically, we run the
following regression:
lnxexitkt = α1 ln dk + γt + µkt,
where lnxexitkt is the average (log) exit sales from market k at time t, dk is the distance from Argentina to
the destination market, and exit sales refer to exports the year before a firm stops exporting for at least one
year. We also include γt to capture year fixed effects. Table 2 reports the results. The results show that
exit sales increase with distance, which implies that fixed costs are larger in more distant destinations.11 To
the extent that sunk and fixed costs involve similar activities, this evidence suggests that sunk costs increase
with distance as well.
Table 2: Exit Sales and Distance
(1) (2)
ln dk 0.571*** 0.616***
(0.129) (0.110)
Constant 0.054 -0.358
(1.179) ( 1.005)
Year FE : no yes
Observations 2193 2193
R-squared 0.008 0.281
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
Table 3 displays survival rates for different country groupings. Panel A groups countries according to
geographical regions. The most salient feature in this panel is that the survival probability is highest for
Argentine firms entering other Latin American countries. Panel B groups countries according to different
distance ranges from Argentina (Short distance, Medium distance and Long distance) and compute the
probability of export survival for each range. The probability is highest in the closest group of countries and
is lowest in the farthest group. Additional evidence reported in Panel B suggests that sharing borders and
language raises the probability of survival by about 10%. Finally, we group countries according to whether
their income level is Low and Middle or High, following the definition of the World Bank. The probability
of survival is about 20% lower for incursions of Argentine firms in High-income countries (Panel C).
One of the clearest messages of Table 3 is that distance affects the probability of export survival. We
can estimate this relationship by running a linear probability model at the incursion level:
Pikt = α1 ln dk + γt + µikt,
where Pikt is the probability of being active T years (T = 2) after the export incursion of firm i in market
11This result also holds if we include firm fixed effects.
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Table 3: Rate of Survival by Year and Region
# Incursions Sales (gmean) Rate of survival
upon entry
Panel A: Regions
Latin America 61918 10091 0.34
North America 10772 8101 0.29
EU 14923 12713 0.30
Spain and Italy 9190 8510 0.27
China 1162 26469 0.25
Rest of the World 20889 20031 0.27
Panel B: Gravities
Short-distance 27109 9487 0.35
Medium-distance 21066 11883 0.33
Long-distance 70679 12162 0.28
Contiguous country 42674 10925 0.34
Same Language 68210 9918 0.33
Panel C: Income
Low and Middle Income Country 73644 12184 0.33
High Income Country 45210 10336 0.27
Total 118854 12161 0.31
k in period t, and dk stands again for the distance between country k and Argentina. Note that, based
on the results of Proposition 1, this probability is the same across all firms that enter market k regardless
of the firm-specific appeal of this market. We also include γt to control for year fixed effects.
12 Since the
main regressor varies at a more aggregate level (k) than the unit of observation (i), we allow the error term
(µikt) to be clustered at the destination level. In addition, we allow for multi-way clustering at the firm and
destination levels following the procedure developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011).13
In Table 4, we report the baseline results of this section. As shown in column 1, the coefficient associated
with distance is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result is almost unaffected by the inclusion of
year fixed effects (column 2). Other country-specific characteristics may also capture differences in fixed and
sunk costs across countries. We consider Common Languagek (whether country k shares the same language
with Argentina) and Contiguityk (whether country k and Argentina share a border). These variables can
arguably be associated with lower sunk and fixed costs. A common language, for example, may facilitate the
establishment and maintenance of distributions networks, as well as ease understanding of country-specific
legal and cultural idiosyncrasies. Contiguity, in turn, is a proxy for geographical distance and cultural
similarities. Column 3 shows that having a common language has a significantly positive effect on the
12Although the theory does not point to yearly changes that should be controlled for with time fixed effects, we include them
to control for the potential effect of movements in the exchange rate. In particular, a devaluation as the one that occurred in
Argentina in 2002 may induce discrete jumps in θkt. Those jumps may either increase the survival probability of firms that
have already entered a foreign market or they may increase it for firms that might enter this market with a value of θkt above
the entry threshold.
13We cannot apply this procedure to cluster at the firm and destination levels when we control for firm or firm-year fixed
effects (as we do later in Tables 7 and A.1) because the estimated variance-covariance matrix is not positive semi-definite. This
procedure cannot be used either when we estimate using a Probit model as a robustness check (Table A.1).
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Table 4: Survival and Gravities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln dk -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.008]
Common Languagek 0.025** 0.041**
(0.013) (0.017)
[0.012] [0.018]
Contiguityk -0.011 -0.017
(0.013) (0.015)
[0.012] [0.016]
lnXikt 0.031***
(0.001)
[0.001]
ln NINCURit 0.014***
(0.001)
[0.001]
Constant 0.533*** 0.542*** 0.497*** 0.264***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.064) (0.001)
[0.023] [0.026] [0.059] [0.001]
Year FE : no yes yes yes
Observations 118,776 118,776 118,776 118,776
R-squared 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.044
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the destination level
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered (two-way) by firm and destination
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
probability of survival. By contrast, the effect of contiguity is not significant. In any event, the effect of
distance is robust to the inclusion of these two controls.
There is a mismatch between our theoretical results and their empirical implementation. In our model,
since time is continuous firms make an incursion into a new destination as soon as export profitability hits
the entry threshold. Hence, we calculate the survival probability after T periods since that precise instant
in time. In the data, time is discretized in yearly periods. Thus, reported export sales in the year of entry
aggregate through time the implication for sales of a continuum of profitability shocks. Even if firms enter
with equal (instantaneous) sales, the yearly figure we observe incorporates a specific trajectory of θkt once it
has passed the entry threshold. In addition, as we do not know the exact moment at which the incursion takes
place within the reported year, the time span over which sales are aggregated may vary across incursions.
To control for this mismatch, we include export sales at the year of the incursion (Xikt) and the number of
simultaneous incursions by firm i in year t (NINCURit). Both variables capture the combined effect of the
profitability trajectory – since entry until the end of the reported period – and the time of entry within the
period. For example, a firm that has entered market k at the beginning of the reported period and since then
has received positive shocks to profitability will exhibit both higher reported sales in market k during the
period and entry into additional export markets. In both cases, these are proxies for a high θkt, which will
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raise the probability of survival. As expected, column 4 shows that both variables are positively associated
with export survival. Nonetheless, the estimated effect of distance becomes stronger.
To interpret the magnitude of the effect of distance, consider the difference in survival probabilities
between entering a short-distance and a long-distance destination. According to Table 3, the probability of
survival upon entering a short-distance country is 0.07 percentage points higher. Consider now the difference
in the average (log) distance from Argentina to each of these two groups of countries. This difference is 2.473
(not shown). As the coefficient associated with dk is -0.024 (column 3), the difference in distance between
these two country groups implies a predicted variation in export survival of 0.06 percentage points. Thus,
variation in distance explains 85% of the observed difference in survival probabilities between short-distance
and long-distance destinations.
We have also run additional regressions to check the robustness of our results. These are as follows:
(i) we control for firm-invariant characteristics by including firm fixed effects; (ii) we estimate the effect of
distance with a probit instead of a linear probability model; (iii) we use a definition of survival that imposes
consecutive export spells (at least three years) and treats re-entries as new export incursions; (iv) we re-
define “export survival” more strictly by imposing that a new export incursion has to be active three years
later instead of two. We have also considered different samples of our data. As we do not observe whether
a firm exported to a particular market before 1994, we might have treated a re-entry as a new incursion.
To mitigate this potential bias, we restrict the analysis to incursions after 1997. This ensures that the firm
did not export in the last 4 years before the incursion took place in the new market. We also address the
potential effects of the currency devaluation of 2002 by excluding incursions in years 2000, 2001 and 2002
from our sample. This ensures that survival rates are not artificially high as a result of the unexpected
devaluation. Finally, we restrict the sample to manufacturing goods (Harmonized System 2-digit categories
greater than 27). The results of these alternative specifications are reported in Appendix Table A.1. None
of these results changes the main message in a relevant way: the probability of survival is lower in more
distant destinations and is usually higher in countries related by other gravity variables.
4 Model fit and quantitative implications
The fact that the survival rate decreases with distance and increases with other gravities implies that SkFk
decreases with distance and increases with other gravities as well. In this section, we parametrize the
relationship between SkFk and distance and estimate it using the model developed in section 2. Then, we
study the model’s implications for re-entry patterns and the contribution of new exporters to aggregate
exports. Finally, we conduct counterfactuals alternatively removing sunk costs, and decreasing fixed costs
and foreign tariffs.
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4.1 Quantifying the sunk-to-fixed cost ratio
The probability of survival in market k depends on a subset of model parameters
{
µ, σ, υ, SkFk
}
, as can be
inferred from equations (1) and (3). To simulate the model, we need to assign them specific values. First,
given a ratio µσ the model cannot rationalize a probability of survival at time T below the lower bound
Φ
(
µ
σ
√
T
)
, which arises when Sk = 0. This is an important restriction. For example, to rationalize the
predicted survival probability of 0.268 delivered by our OLS estimates for the most distant market in the
data, the model requires a ratio µσ ≤ −0.44. This bound coincides with the ratio calibrated by Impullitti,
Irarrazabal, and Opromolla (2013), who to the best of our knowledge obtain the most negative value of µσ
in the literature. We set µσ = −0.44 to maximize predictive power while maintaining µσ within the range of
available estimates. For ratios closer to zero, the model gradually loses its ability to explain the variability
of survival with distance, eventually predicting Sk = 0 for all markets.
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Having set µσ , we need to set these parameters’ absolute values. In section 4.2, we show that the upper
tail of the exporter profitability distribution is Pareto with shape parameter r2 =
1
σ
(
−µσ +
√(
µ
σ
)2
+ 2gB
)
,
where gB is the growth rate in the mass of new firms. In this section, we assume a constant mark-up arising
from CES preferences and monopolistic competition. Thus, r2 also describes the upper tail of the sales
distribution. Using our customs data for the top five destinations, we find that the upper tail of the exporter
size distribution is well approximated by a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter of 1.44.15 Using this
parameter value in the above formula and setting gB = 0.038 to match the average annual growth rate in
the number of exporters in our database, we obtain µ = −0.29 and σ = 0.66.16 Last, we set υ = 0.1 to
match the average annual real lending rate in Argentina between 1995 and 2006.17
Finally, we posit a log-linear relationship SkFk = ς0 + ς1 ln dk. Since we are interested in the relationship
between survival and distance we estimate ς0 and ς1 by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to
match the sample analogs of E [Pikt] and E [Pikt ln dk].
18 We restrict the parameter space so that SkFk ≥ 0
for all distances in our database. We perform this estimation for our baseline case, where we set µσ = −0.44,
and for an alternative case, where we set µσ = −0.66.
Panel A of Table 5 displays the estimation results. In the baseline estimation, the model fits the moments
very well, implying that the nonnegativity constraint on SkFk does not play a major role.
19 As expected, the
ratio of sunk to fixed costs decreases with distance. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this ratio and its estimated
14We find that when µ
σ
= −0.35 the predicted probability of survival barely varies with distance. This implication applies,
in particular, to the less negative µ
σ
used in Luttmer (2007) and in Arkolakis (Forthcoming).
15More specifically, for each year and destination we restrict the sample to the 1% largest firms and regress log (salesikt)
against the fraction of firms that export at least salesikt. If the distribution is Pareto with shape parameter r2, then the slope
coefficient is − 1
r2
. Then, we take the simple average across destinations and years. We use the top five destinations measured
by the average number of firms in the sample (in order: Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, the United States and Paraguay) to have a
reasonable number of firms. Doing the same computation for French exporters, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) find an
average number of 1.49.
16In the steady state, all aggregate variables grow at rate gB .
17We deflate the annual nominal lending rate by the consumer price index, using data from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) database.
18See details in Appendix A.2.
19This restriction still binds in our baseline estimation. As µ
σ
becomes closer to 0, the restriction turns more important and
the model decreases its ability to fit the moments. Conversely, the model’s fit improves with more negative µ
σ
.
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range of variation are both strikingly small. In our baseline specification, the ratio varies from a maximum
value of 0.09 for the shortest distance to 0 for the longest distance.20 These figures are sensitive to the choice
of µσ . To illustrate this point, we re-estimated the model with a 50% more negative
µ
σ . The estimates in this
alternative case imply a maximum SkFk that is one order of magnitude larger (the maximum ratio is 0.54).
Under both specifications, the importance of sunk costs vis-a-vis fixed costs is at odds with existing
estimates in the literature. For example, working with a similar model to ours, Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and
Opromolla (2013) find that sunk costs are 65 times larger than fixed costs. Similarly, Das, Roberts, and
Tybout (2007) and Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014) find that sunk costs are substantial but fixed costs
are negligible or substantially lower. Impullitti, Irarrazabal, and Opromolla (2013) obtain such a high SkFk
estimate because they do not use survival rates upon entry to discipline their estimation procedure. At odds
with the data, their model implies a survival probability of 0.95 two years after entry.21 We cannot compute
implied survival probabilities upon entry for the other two papers so we cannot check goodness of fit in this
dimension. Nevertheless, we think our different results stem from the fact that they impose assumptions
about the correlation between domestic and foreign profitability to infer the magnitude of sunk costs. In
particular, they infer that sunk costs are high when profitable firms in the domestic market do not enter the
foreign market. In our case, failure to enter a foreign market does not convey information about sunk costs
as this behavior can always be rationalized with a low value of ψ for firms that do not enter.
The small magnitude of the sunk-to-fixed cost ratio implies there should be a significant amount of re-entry
in export markets, especially in more distant ones. To test this implication, we computed the share of entrants
that survive at T = 2 having exited at T = 1. We call these firms ”re-entrants”. Furthermore, we run a simple
OLS regression of the probability of being a re-entrant on (log) distance to compute a predicted range of
variation for this share across destinations.22 Panel B in Table 5 displays the results. The model is successful
at explaining these moments, which were not targeted in the estimation.23 In the baseline parametrization,
the model matches the average share of re-entrants (23%) very well.24 Furthermore, the model is qualitatively
consistent with the fact that this share increases with distance, although it quantitatively underpredicts its
range of variation.
In sum, our focus on survival probabilities suggests that within the confines of a standard framework that
includes (only) sunk costs, fixed costs, and a highly persistent profitability process, sunk costs are necessary
to explain the observed variation of survival rates across countries. Still, their overall size is much smaller
20To interpret this ratio, note that a firm pays exactly F if it exports the entire year without interruption. However, effective
fixed costs accumulated during a year are often lower in the model as firms can costlessly suspend operations.
21To compute this probability as in their model, we add costly re-entry (as described in the Online Appendix) and a death rate
δ. We use their calibrated parameter values for S
F
, the interest rate r, the death rate δ, and the parameters of the profitability
process µ and σ. This parameter configuration yields a similar survival probability assuming instead costless re-entry.
22More specifically, we run yik = β0 + β1xk, where xk is (log) distance to market k and yik is one if incursion i to market
k (in year T ) survived at T + 2 but not at T + 1 and 0 if it survived both at T + 1 and T + 2. We obtained βˆ0 = 0.12 and
βˆ1 = 0.014. Including year fixed effects does not change the results.
23Specifically, in the model we compute
P (θ˜k2>1,θ˜k1<1)
P (θ˜k2>1)
, i.e. the probability that a firm that is outside at T = 1 exports at
T = 2, normalized by the mass of survivors at T = 2.
24The alternative parametrization yields a worse fit. Since the drift is more negative, conditional on surviving at T = 2,
having survived at T = 1 becomes more likely. We interpret this as evidence favoring our baseline calibration of µ
σ
.
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Table 5: Estimation Results
Baseline estimation Alternative estimation
µ
σ = -0.44
µ
σ = -0.66
Panel A: SF Data
Coefficient estimates
ς0 0.244 1.274
(0.000) (0.000)
ς1 -0.025 -0.117
(0.000) (0.000)
Implied range of SF
min SF 0.000 0.124
max SF 0.089 0.542
Moments
E(Pikt) 0.322 0.308 0.308
E (Pikt ∗ ln(dk)) 2.669 2.546 2.546
Panel B: Re-entry share Data (Average) and OLS
prediction (max and min)
Average 23.46% 16.73% 22.92%
min distance 23.29% 16.60% 20.19%
max distance 23.60% 16.84% 25.09%
Panel C: θ0 Data
Coefficient estimates
η0 6.045 6.975
[0.056] [0.056]
η1 -0.972 -1.009
[0.007] [0.007]
Implied range of θ0
min θ0 0.029 0.051
max θ0 0.950 1.906
Moments
E(MktMt ) 0.016 0.016 0.016
E
(
Mkt
Mt ∗ ln(dk)
)
0.002 0.002 0.002
Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the firm level
Robust standard errors in brackets
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than previous estimates. Furthermore, the results underscore the important role played by fixed costs in
explaining the observed patterns of geographical variation in survival rates. Based on the idea laid out in
section 2 that sunk costs are a stock of export-associated activities that depreciates over time and fixed costs
are the activities that restore the depreciated stock, a potential interpretation of our empirical results is
that the stock of export activities depreciates more rapidly in distant countries. This would be the case if,
for example, distribution networks were more difficult to maintain in distant countries or if distant markets
required a higher proportion of business services to adapt to changing market conditions. This interpretation
would also be consistent with marketing activities that become more preponderant in distant markets.
4.2 Contribution of new exporters to aggregate exports
The relative size of sunk and fixed costs has important potential implications for the contribution of new
exporters to aggregate exports. To evaluate those implications, we first need to determine the distribution
of exporter profitability. In particular, a key component of this distribution is the relative density of firms
near the entry threshold. This density directly affects the strength of adjustment along the extensive margin
and thus shapes the dynamics of aggregate exports as well as its response to policies and shocks.
Under the assumption that the mass of new firms grow at rate gB , Appendix A.3 shows that the cross-
sectional distribution of (normalized) profitability θ˜kt is a double Pareto distribution with a kink at θ˜k0:
f
(
θ˜k
)
=
 r1r2r1+r2 θ˜
r1−1
k θ˜
−r1
k0 if θ˜k < θ˜k0
r1r2
r1+r2
θ˜−r2−1k θ˜
r2
k0 if θ˜k ≥ θ˜k0
 (4)
where r1 =
1
σ
(
µ
σ +
√(
µ
σ
)2
+ 2gB
)
and r2 =
1
σ
(
−µσ +
√(
µ
σ
)2
+ 2gB
)
. Similarly, the cross-sectional distri-
bution of (normalized) profitability θ˜kt of inside firms (i.e. those that have already paid the sunk cost) is
also a double Pareto distribution with the same shape parameters but with a kink at θ˜∗k instead of at θ˜k0.
A key element of the size distribution is the profitability at birth, θ˜k0. While survival probabilities are
independent of this parameter (as long as θ˜k0 < θ˜
∗
k), the size distribution is not. Thus, we need to estimate
it for each k. Define the entry rate as the number of firms exporting to k over the total number of firms
(MktMt ). Appendix A.3 shows that this rate can be expressed as:
Mkt
Mt
=
{
1− r2
r1 + r2
θ˜∗−r1k
}(
θ˜k0
θ˜∗k
)r2
. (5)
This result intuitively establishes that the entry rate is increasing in θ˜k0 (given θ˜
∗
k). We construct the
empirical analog of MktMt by obtaining Mt from the number of manufacturing firms reported in Argentina’s
2003 Economic Census and Mkt from the number of manufacturing firms in our database exporting to k in
that same year.25 We posit a linear relationship ln θ˜k0 = η0 + η1 ln dk. Given {η0, η1}, this equation yields a
25We calculate this ratio using manufacturing firms because the Economic Census does not include agricultural activities.
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prediction for θ˜k0 and hence for the entry rate in market k. We estimate η0 and η1 by GMM to match the
sample analogs of E
[
Mk
M
]
and E
[
Mk
M ln dk
]
.26
Panel C of Table 5 displays the results. The coefficient estimates imply that θ˜k0, and hence entry rates,
are lower in farther away destinations. Since SkFk needs to be lower in more distant countries to explain their
lower survival rates, the model rationalizes a lower entry rate in those countries by lowering normalized
initial profitability θ˜k0. This implies a lower ψk, which would follow naturally in a microfounded model due
to higher variable transport costs or a weaker match with idiosyncratic demand.
Equipped with all required parameters, we analyze the model implications for the contribution of new
exporters to aggregate exports. At any arbitrary time t with the economy at the steady state, we classify
firms in two groups: old exporters (“inside” firms) and new exporters (either “outside” firms or firms unborn
at t). Then, we simulate the evolution of each group’s aggregate exports at dates t′ > t and compute the
share explained by new exporters (see details in Online Appendix 3). We perform this simulation for a
fictitious “short-distance” market 1 located at the 25 distance percentile and for another “long-distance”
market 2 located at the 75 distance percentile.27 Finally, we compare these model predictions with the data.
In the data, we identify a firm as a “new exporter” in market k if it exported to that destination in 1997 or
later without having exported in 1994, 1995 and 1996. We aggregate exports across markets into two groups,
“short” and “long” distance, depending on whether they are below or above the median distance.
Figure 2 compares model predictions with data for our baseline and alternative estimations. While very
stylized, the model does a reasonable job of explaining the contribution of new exporters to aggregate exports
in the baseline estimation. Nevertheless, it systematically overpredicts this contribution, especially at long
distances. In the case of the alternative estimation (with µσ = −0.66), the fit is considerably worse. In this
case, new exporters counterfactually explain most of aggregate exports in a very short time. The reason is
that with a more negative µσ , positive innovations are more likely to be reversed tomorrow. Hence, future
success is mostly determined by luck rather than current profitability, which implies that new firms are less
at a disadvantage at birth. Importantly, this evidence strongly favors calibrations of µσ that deliver smaller
Sk
Fk
such as in our baseline case.28
26See details in Appendix A.2.
27More specifically, 25% of the export observations go to markets closer (more distant) than market 1 (2).
28In essence, in the region of our baseline µ
σ
there is a trade-off between fitting the survival moments and fitting the contribution
of new exporters to aggregate exports.
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Figure 2: Contribution of new exporters to aggregate exports
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Finally, note that the model does not predict any quantitatively significant variability with distance:
The paths for the short- and long-distance destinations are almost indistinguishable. In contrast, the data
suggests that new exporters explain a larger share of aggregate exports in more distant destinations.
4.3 Counterfactual analysis
Our estimation results point to a small ratio SkFk . However, this does not imply that sunk costs are unim-
portant. For example, we already know that, albeit small, they are capable of explaining the variability of
survival rates with distance. In this section, we study the importance of sunk costs using another metric:
their impact on aggregate exports and the response to trade shocks.
Consider markets 1 (short distance) and 2 (long distance) as in the previous section and imagine that
at some point in time Tshock sunk costs in market k are unexpectedly lowered to 0.
29 Note that once sunk
costs are lowered to 0, there is no hysteresis: exporting becomes a static decision. This implies that all the
adjustment occurs instantaneously without transitional dynamics. In fact, at Tshock only outside firms in
29In keeping our partial equilibrium analysis we assume that (i) the impact of the shock on firm’s overall home labor demand
is negligible; and (ii) firm’s decisions do not affect the destination’s price index. Assumption (i) is reasonable for analyzing a
shock to a single market as long as the implied labor changes are small relative to the overall size of the home labor market.
Assumption (ii) is reasonable for a small open economy such as Argentina.
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Table 6: Counterfactual Results
Baseline estimation Alternative estimation
µ
σ = -0.44
µ
σ = -0.66
Change in aggregate exports (%)
Short distance 1.40 11.95
Long distance 0.31 5.85
Change in τF
Short distance 0.0321 0.2794
Long distance 0.0070 0.1358
Change in τu
Short distance 0.0048 0.0385
Long distance 0.0011 0.0196
the hysteresis region change their behavior by entering the market. Using (4) and the analogue for inside
firms (11), it is straightforward to compute the ratio of outside firms in this region to the total number of
exporters in the original stationary distribution. Our estimates imply that the region is not quantitatively
important: in our baseline estimation, new entrants represent only 4.4% and 1% of the original exporters
in the short-distance and long-distance destinations, respectively. Thus, as shown in Table 6, the impact of
removing sunk costs on aggregate exports is very low: 1.4% and 0.3% for the two distances, respectively. The
low entry response is due to the fact that, in our baseline case, estimated sunk costs are low. For comparison,
Table 6 also shows the predictions for the case with µσ = −0.66. Since sunk costs are much higher in this
case, outside firms in the hysteresis region represent 38.6% and 18.4% of the original exporters. As a result,
the aggregate export response is more than an order of magnitude larger.
Next, we compare the effect of eliminating sunk costs with a different set of shocks. First, we assume
that at time Tshock fixed costs in market k are unexpectedly reduced to (1− τF )Fk forever. Second, we
assume that at time Tshock tariffs τk charged to Argentine firms in market k are unexpectedly reduced to
(1− τU ) τk forever. In a CES monopolistic competition framework, this reduction increases potential sales to
(1− τU )−ε θ˜kt, where ε is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, which we set equal to 2. We compute
the size of τF and τU that generate the same aggregate export response in the steady state as eliminating
sunk costs (details in Appendix A.4). Unsurprisingly, Table 6 shows that τF is very small while τU is even
smaller.30 The response to these two shocks has transitional dynamics in this case. The fact that fixed costs
or tariffs are lower implies firms are more likely to become insiders. This “extra kick” from the shock only
affects outside firms after Tshock. Thus, as long as Sk > 0, the long-run export elasticity will be larger than
the short-run elasticity. While this statement is qualitatively true, in our simulations we find that aggregate
exports converge to their new long-run level within a year in all cases.31 Beyond this particular calibration
of the trade shocks, this exercise shows that the SkFk ratio that rationalizes the facts in this paper does not
30τU decreases with ε (not shown) so given our choice of ε the current number can be interpreted as an upper bound.
31This is true also for the case with larger sunk costs, although in that case the result is driven by the negative µ
σ
, which
induces a fast convergence.
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generate interesting transitional dynamics.32
5 Determinants of export survival (II): Interdependent markets
The framework developed in section 2 ruled out possible interdependencies across markets. However, entry
decisions might be connected across markets in various forms. For example, Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014)
find that sunk export costs can be substantially reduced if a firm has previously entered a market with the
same language. In this section, we allow entry and exit decisions into different markets to be connected by
having common sunk- and fixed-cost components that vary with previous export experience. In other words,
we study how exporting history matters for understanding export survival. We first develop analytically the
case of interdependent sunk costs. In this case, we find that previous export experience lowers the probability
of survival by reducing the effective sunk cost. Second, we treat the case of interdependent fixed costs. The
result in this case is ambiguous.
5.1 Interdependent sunk costs
We assume that the sunk cost required to enter the first market, k, within a “group” of countries g has two
components. The first is a common sunk cost Sg > 0 paid only once to enter group g. The second is a
country-specific sunk cost S˜k. Thus:
Sk = Sg + S˜k.
Fixed costs are assumed to be independent across markets. Country group g could be defined according to
language, regional location, or income level. For example, the common component Sg could capture sunk
costs associated with the translation of instruction manuals and packaging materials, which need not be
repaid once paid in another country that speaks the same language. Similarly, sunk costs associated with
quality upgrading to enter high income countries could be paid only once to serve all markets with a similar
income level. Country group g could also be defined to be the entire world. For example, a firm might need
to pay a sunk cost to learn the customs regulations in its own country only the first time it exports. While
the theoretical treatment of group g in this section is general, the empirical analysis in section 6 explores
the contours of country groups where interdependence matters.
We will distinguish two types of firms: (a) the experienced firm has already entered another market in
group g; (b) the inexperienced firm has not yet entered any market in that group. Equation (1) determines
the unique entry threshold θ∗k(Sk) in the case of independent markets as a function of the sunk cost. In
contrast, with interdependent sunk costs the thresholds of experienced and inexperienced firms are different.
Denote by θ∗Ek the entry threshold for experienced firms and θ
∗
Ik (θ−k) the entry threshold for inexperienced
firms. Once a firm becomes experienced, the exporting decision becomes independent across markets. In
32This would also be true for real exchange rate shocks, which in a microfounded model can be understood as a combination
of our τU and τF shocks.
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contrast, when a firm is inexperienced the decision to enter is linked across markets: A firm will be more
likely to enter market k if it is also considering entering some other market k′. In other words, despite
having a higher sunk cost, inexperienced firms now find that entering the first market may have “strategic
value” and therefore decide to enter earlier. Notwithstanding this possibility, Proposition 3 shows that the
probability of survival is always higher for the inexperienced firm.
Proposition 3. θ∗Ek ≤ infθ−k θ∗Ik (θ−k). Hence, P (θ∗Ek) ≤ infθ−k {P (θ∗Ik (θ−k))}.
Proof. Following the notation in section 2, let V E0k denote the value function of an experienced firm that
is “outside” market k and V E1k denote the value function of an experienced firm that is “inside” market k.
Note these value functions can be obtained using the same steps as in section 2. Furthermore, let V I denote
the value function of an inexperienced firm. Note there is no subindex k on V I since the value function is
not separable across markets when the firm is inexperienced.
Suppose infθ−k θ
∗
Ik (θ−k) < θ
∗
Ek. Then, we can pick some θ−k such that for θ
∗
Ik
(
θ−k
)
the inequality
is satisfied strictly. Since the inexperienced firm is indifferent between exporting to (at least) k and not
exporting at θ∗Ik (θ−k),
V I
(
θ∗Ik
(
θ−k
)
,θ−k
)
= V E1k
(
θ∗Ik
(
θ−k
))− S˜k − Sg +∑
−k
max
{
V E0k′ (θk′) , V
E
1k′ (θk′)− S˜k′
}
. (6)
Next, note that the firm could always follow this strategy: enter market k at θ˜∗Ek and just pay Sg in the
market the firm reaches θ∗Ek first. The outcome of this strategy - J - satisfies
J (θk) ≥
∑
k
max
{
V E0k (θk) , V
E
1k (θk)− S˜k
}
− Sg.
Since J is feasible,
V I
(
θ∗Ik
(
θ−k
)
,θ−k
) ≥∑
k
max
{
V E0k (θk) , V
E
1k (θk)− S˜k
}
− Sg (7)
Replacing (6) in (7) and noting that θ∗Ik
(
θ−k
)
< θ∗Ek,
V E1k
(
θ∗Ik
(
θ−k
))− S˜k ≥ V E0k (θ∗Ik (θ−k)) .
This is a contradiction since inaction is strictly optimal for experienced firms in market k when θ∗Ik
(
θ−k
)
<
θ∗Ek. Thus, infθ−k θ
∗
Ik (θ−k) ≥ θ∗Ek. Since exit thresholds are equal in both cases, this result immediately
implies that P (θ∗Ek) ≤ infθ−k {P (θ∗Ik (θ−k))}. QED
Proposition 3 states that the probability of survival in market k is always lower for firms with previous
history when previous export activities reduce sunk costs of entry in new markets. In a regression framework
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that controls for destination fixed effects, this result implies that the different forms of export experience
should have a negative effect on the survival probability. We will assess the empirical relevance of this
prediction in the next section.
5.2 Interdependent fixed costs
In contrast to the case of interdependent sunk costs, there are not sharp results in the case of interdependent
fixed costs. Based on the results of Proposition 2, we would expect that if fixed costs are interdependent
then experienced firms will survive more than their inexperienced counterparts because they only need to
pay a fraction of the fixed cost. Unfortunately, although this is a possible case, the reverse outcome is also
possible. Thus, the case of interdependent fixed costs yields ambiguous results.
Analogously to our treatment of sunk costs, we assume that fixed costs in market k have two components:
Fk = Fg + F˜k
where Fg is a common component of fixed costs paid only once in group g and F˜k is an idiosyncratic market-
k component. When an experienced firm enters market k, on the margin it only needs to pay F˜k (Sk is
assumed here to be unaffected by experience). Hence, in this case not only entry but also exit decisions are
interconnected across markets. Since the order in which firms exit these markets matters, a general treatment
of the case of interdependent fixed costs is substantially more complicated than the case of interdependent
sunk costs. Nevertheless, a case with only two countries and θkt processes that are perfectly correlated across
markets is sufficient to show how the counter-intuitive prediction for survival probabilities can arise.
Consider an arbitrary firm i and define ψi ≡ ψiAψiB . We know that there is a ψiA sufficiently high (relative
to ψiB) that firm i will want to enter market A first. Hence, denote by ψ¯
entry the threshold such that
firm i enters this market first if ψi > ψ¯
entry
A . There is also a threshold ψ¯
entry
B (ψ¯
entry
A > ψ¯
entry
B ) such that
firm i will want to enter market B first if ψi < ψ¯
entry
B .
33 Similarly, we can find ψ¯exitA and ψ¯
exit
B such that
firm i will exit market A last if ψi > ψ¯
exit
A , will exit B last if ψi < ψ¯
exit
B , and will exit both markets
simultaneously if ψi is between these two thresholds. The entry and exit thresholds in general will not
coincide so many different cases arise. We will focus on a case in which ψ¯entryB > ψ¯
exit
A to show the possibility
of contradictory predictions on survival probabilities for experienced and inexperienced firms. Given this
assumption, ψ¯entryA > ψ¯
entry
B also implies that ψ¯
entry
A > ψ¯
exit
A .
Consider a firm (firm 1) with a sufficiently high relative profitability in market A such that ψ1 > ψ¯
entry
A >
ψ¯exitA . This firm will enter market A first and will leave it last. We will call this a “regular” firm. Since
firm 1 enters market A first, it is inexperienced when it enters A and it is experienced when it enters B. In
the case of a regular firm, the analysis is greatly simplified. Since the firm enters market A first and exits it
last, it can impute the common component of the fixed cost (Fg) to A, which bears the burden of the full
33In between these two thresholds, the firm will enter the two markets simultaneously.
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cost (FA), while imputing only the idiosyncratic component of the fixed cost (F˜B) to B. Formally, it can be
shown that in the regular case the entry threshold (θ∗A) is the same as in the independent case (see Online
Appendix 4). Therefore, the problem becomes equivalent to the problem with independent fixed and sunk
costs, where fixed costs are FA in market A and F˜B in market B.
Now consider another regular firm (firm 2) in the opposite situation. That is, suppose that its relative
profitability is sufficiently high in market B such that ψ2 < ψ¯
entry
B and ψ2 < ψ¯
exit
B . This firm enters market
B first (as an inexperienced firm) and leaves it last. Hence, it imputes the full burden of the common fixed
cost (FB) to B. In market A instead it enters as an experienced firm and imputes only the idiosyncratic
component F˜A. Comparing the survival probabilities of firms 1 and 2 in market A, it is easy to notice that
since the inexperienced firm (firm 1) imputes a higher fixed cost in this market (FA) than the fixed cost
(F˜A) imputed by the experienced firm (firm 2), the probability of survival for the latter firm will be higher.
Analogously, the probability of survival will also be higher in B for the firm that enters as experienced in
this market (firm 1). Thus, the results when both firms are regular accord with the intuition derived from
Proposition 2: experienced firms survive more because they have a lower fixed cost. The formal derivation
of this result is provided in Online Appendix 4.
Next, consider an alternative firm (firm 2) with ψ2 < ψ¯
entry
B but ψ2 > ψ¯
exit
A . This firm will enter market
B first but will also exit first this market. We will call this a “reversal” firm. Let us consider the probability
of survival of this firm in market A. Since the firm is already paying the common fixed cost in B, it will
enter A with a lower normalized profitability θ˜ than the entry profitability of firm 1, which is regular and
inexperienced. However, both firms exit market A with the same normalized profitability since they both
exit it last. It follows that the experienced, reversal firm survives less than the inexperienced, regular firm
in market A. This is the opposite prediction to the one derived above.
In sum, the comparison of survival probabilities for experienced and inexperienced firms cannot be signed
unambiguously when fixed costs are interdependent. Nonetheless, in the regular case experience lowers
imputed fixed costs and hence increases the survival probability. This is the opposite outcome to the case
of interdependent sunk costs. In section 6, the predictions of the regular case will be those with the ability
to explain the estimated effect of experience on observed survival rates.
6 Empirical analysis (II): Interdependent markets
The theoretical results obtained in section 4 state that export experience matters. In a context of market
interdependency, gaining export experience may reduce country specific fixed and sunk costs in new destina-
tions. Thus, variations in experience can explain survival differences across firms in a given market according
to the stage of their exporting history at the time of entry. Our previous analysis established that experience
can affect the probability of survival through two channels. First, experience can reduce sunk costs, in which
case it should lower the probability of survival (Proposition 3). Second, experience can reduce fixed costs,
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in which case it can either further reduce this probability (in the reversal case) or, conversely, increase the
chances of survival (in the regular case). Next we explore which effect dominates in the data.
We distinguish two broad forms of experience. First, we explore the effect of “general” exporting experi-
ence, acquired over the life of the firm as an exporter regardless of the specific destinations it has previously
served. Then, in subsection 6.2, we confine the effect of experience to that acquired by having previously
exported to a group of related countries. We denote the latter “specific” experience.
6.1 General exporting experience
There are different ways to capture general exporting experience. Unfortunately, since our dataset starts
in 1994 we do not know the whole history of a firm as an exporter. However, we can construct a number
of indicators that capture essential aspects of this experience. We begin by constructing Exporting Age as
the number of years a firm appears in our dataset before an incursion. Panel A of Table 7 shows basic
descriptive statistics broken down by ranges for this variable. The last column exhibits the survival rate.
We can see that this rate is substantially higher for firms with five or more years of export experience. We
also proxy general experience by the value of past total exports upon entry in a new destination. To do this,
we define Exposureit =
∑t−1
s=1994Xis for a firm i entering a new destination in t. In panel B, we distinguish
incursions by firms with low (below the median) and high (above the median) values of Exposure. We see
that incursions with high exposure display a higher survival rate. As firms may enter a new destination with
a different history of past incursions, we also consider the number of previous incursions as an alternative
way to proxy for general exporting experience. Panel C shows that incursions by firms with a high record
of past incursions tend to survive with a higher probability. Finally, since our dataset starts in 1994, the
three variables explored thus far suffer from truncation. To address this concern, we construct one further
variable. Panel D displays survival rates according to the number of destinations served by the firm the
year before the incursion. A larger number of destinations arguably reflects more experience in the export
market. Since this variable refers only to the previous year of the incursion, we do not need export data
before 1994. As we can see in the table, the survival rate increases in the number of destinations served
during the year previous to the incursion.
The broad message emerging from Table 7 is that the probability of export survival upon entry in a new
destination is higher for experienced firms. To further study this effect, we first run the following linear
probability model:
Pikt = α1 ln dk +D
e
it + γt + µikt
where dk is the distance from Argentina to country k, γt represents year-fixed effects, and D
e
it is an indicator
variable that equals one if firm i exported anywhere in the past. Column 1 of Table 8 shows that Deit is
positively associated with a higher probability of survival. Also, the effect of distance is moderately higher
than the estimates reported on Table 4.
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Table 7: Rate of Survival and Experience
# Incursions Sales (gmean) Rate of survival
upon entry
Panel A: Exporting Age
1 43027 11409 0.29
2-5 54279 12107 0.30
More than 5 21548 9994 0.35
Panel B: Export Exposure
Low export exposure 59420 9012 0.28
High export exposure 59420 14535 0.32
Panel C: Number of previous incursions
0 54270 12812 0.30
1 14487 7905 0.28
2 9448 7962 0.29
3-5 16329 8951 0.31
6-15 16776 11971 0.34
More than 15 7544 25101 0.37
Panel D: Number of destinations in t− 1
0 50242 10458 0.28
1 16399 8407 0.28
2 10093 9702 0.30
3-5 16658 10569 0.34
6-15 17764 14214 0.35
more than 15 7698 35588 0.38
Total 118854 11445 0.31
Since we are interested in the marginal effect of experience on survival, we do not need to find observable
proxies for the cross-country variation in sunk and fixed costs. Instead, we can simply include destination
fixed effects to control for country-specific sunk and fixed costs and rely solely on variation in survival rates
between experienced and inexperienced firms within a destination. In column 2 of Table 8, we verify that
the effect of Deit remains positive with a slightly higher coefficient.
We turn now to the analysis of different forms of general exporting experience and estimate:
Pikt = γk + Experienceit + γt + µikt,
where Experienceit is the general name for any of the four proxies for export experience described above and
γt are year fixed effects. In columns 3-6 of Table 8, we report the specific effect of each of the proxies for
experience (in logs): Exporting Ageit (column 3); Exposureit (column 4); Number of previous incursionsit
(column 5); and Number of destinationsi,t−1 (column 6).34 All these different ways to capture experience are
34In fact, we calculate the logarithm of 1 + x to be able to take the log of the variable of interest when it takes a value of 0.
Note that this transformation is more innocuous than, for example, transforming the dependent variable in a gravity equation
since our theoretical results do not specify a functional form for the impact of these indicators of experience on the probability
of survival. We prefer a logarithm specification because we expect a lower marginal impact on the probability of survival when
the value of these variables are large.
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positively associated with survival upon entry. In column 7, we include all controls for experience together.
The estimation results suggest that, when included together, the most significant forms of export experience
are exposure and the number of previously served destinations.
As a final robustness exercise we include two additional specifications. First, as previously discussed we
include the value of exports at the moment of the incursion (Xikt) and the number of simultaneous incursions
(NINCURit). Then, we drop incursions failing during the first year to verify that the results are not driven
by occasional exporters (column 9). The estimated effect of experience is not substantially affected by the
inclusion of these additional controls.35
The results show that export experience induces a higher probability of export survival. The inference
we can make from this finding is twofold. First, the “regular” case needs to prevail over the “reversal” case
to account for the positive effect of experience on export survival. Second, the effect of export experience
operating through fixed costs needs to prevail over that operating through sunk costs. This implication points
to the importance of fixed costs to explain variation in survival rates between experienced and inexperienced
firms, and is consistent with the results obtained by exploiting variation in survival rates across export
destinations.
6.2 Specific exporting experience
The potential decrease in sunk and fixed costs needed to serve country k might be limited to export experience
acquired in countries related in some way to k. We analyze this specific form of experience by exploring the
effect of “extended gravities”. This concept, introduced in Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014), captures the
fall in sunk costs for a firm that has previously entered another country sharing the same (official) language,
border or per capita income group. Here, we allow extended gravity variables to affect both sunk and fixed
costs. The interest of this extension goes beyond its prior plausibility. Based on the theoretical results of
the previous section we can expect the effect to go either way depending on the relative strength of extended
gravities on sunk and fixed costs. As in the case of general experience, settling this question is an empirical
matter.
To test whether an export incursion by firm i is more likely to survive upon entry in market k if
this firm has already exported to a related country, we consider the following variables: XContiguityikt,
XLanguageikt and XIncomeikt. These variables are defined as indicators taking the value of one when
country k shares a border, language or per capita income quartile, respectively, with another country that
firm i exported to in t− 1. To estimate Pikt, we run the following linear probability model:
Pikt = γk + α2XContiguityikt + α3XLanguageikt + α4XIncomeikt + γt + µikt.
We are interested in the signs of α2, α3 and α4. If positive, the associated extended gravities would
35To save space, we only report results using Exporting Age as the experience measure but note that results using any of the
other three alternatives are very similar.
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imply an impact on fixed costs with a stronger effect on survival than the impact on sunk costs. Table 9
reports the results. The first column displays a basic regression including as controls only ln dk and year fixed
effects (γt). The extended-gravity variables are all positively associated with export survival. In column
2, we remove ln dk and instead include destination fixed effects (γk) to control simultaneously for distance
and other country-invariant characteristics. Doing this has no major effect on the three relevant coefficients,
except for a higher estimated effect of having exported to a country with the same official language than k
(XLanguageikt). In column 3, we include the value of exports at the moment of the incursion (Xikt) and
the number of simultaneous incursions (NINCURit) while in column 4 we drop incursions failing during the
first year to verify that the results are not driven by the possibility of occasional exporting. The estimated
impact of the extended gravities does not exhibit a substantial change.
A more stringent test of the effect of experience on the survival probability is to rely only on variation in
specific experience for a given firm in a given year. For example, consider a firm entering two new destinations,
A and B, in a given year. Let one of the two destinations, say A, be connected via an extended gravity with
at least one of the markets already served by the firm, while entry in market B does not enjoy the benefits
of any extended gravity. Then, we should expect the probability of survival to differ between countries A
and B once country-specific characteristic are controlled for. We test this implication by including firm-year
fixed effects. This ensures that the effect of extended gravities are tested on firms entering simultaneously
at least two destinations differing in whether they have an extended gravity or not. Column 5 reports the
results. The estimated impact of the extended gravities persists.
Finally, we regress the probability of survival upon entry on both general and specific forms of experience.
As reported in column 6, including general forms of experience does not substantially affect the coefficients
on the extended gravities. At the same time, the effect of general experience does not qualitatively change
once specific experience is controlled for. We interpret this result as an indication that the history of a firm
matters for succeeding in new export markets both as the expression of general exporting experience and as
the expression of specific knowledge acquired by having previously exported to related markets.
Specific export experience raises the probability of survival upon entry in a new destination. As in the
cases of general exporting experience and distance, this result is consistent with specific experience having an
impact on fixed costs that prevails over its impact on sunk costs. This result is an interesting counterpoint
to the findings of Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2014). They find that XLanguageikt reduces sunk costs but
assume that extended gravities do not affect fixed costs. Our findings have a different implication. They
show that the effect of the extended gravities are not confined to sunk costs. If only sunk costs varied with
extended gravities, their effect on the probability of survival would be the opposite to what we find. In fact,
we find that the impact on fixed costs needs to have a stronger effect than the impact on sunk costs to
explain the observed relationship between extended gravities and the probability of survival upon entry.
33
Table 9: Survival and Specific Exporting Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln dk -0.034***
(0.003)
[0.004]
XContiguitykt 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.032*** 0.047*** 0.045***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005)
[0.007] [0.01] [0.016] [0.007] † [0.013]
XLanguagekt 0.029*** 0.048*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.04***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007)
[0.008] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] † [0.010]
XIncomeQuartileit 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.047***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.01) (0.006)
[0.006] [0.012] [0.016] [0.012] † [0.011]
lnXikt 0.031***
(0.002)
[0.002]
ln NINCURit 0.084***
(0.004)
[0.010]
ln Exporting Agei,t 0.012**
(0.005)
[0.007]
ln Exposurei,t -0.002
(0.001)
[0.001]
ln Number of previous incursionsi,t -0.01
(0.03)
[0.06]
ln Number of destinationsi,t−1 0.006***
(0.0004)
[0.0001]
Constant 0.546*** 0.284*** -0.043** 0.634*** -0.136*** 0.286***
(0.027) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.05) (0.006)
[0.03] [0.01] [0.019] [0.009] † [0.014]
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE no no no no yes no
Observations 118,776 118,854 118,852 56,464 118,854 118,854
R-squared 0.018 0.025 0.067 0.015 0.578 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the destination level
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered (two-way) by firm and destination
†Two-way clustering by firm and destination cannot be performed
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the empirical and theoretical determinants of survival upon entry in a new export
market. In a model where firms face uncertainty about future profitability and exporting involves fixed
and sunk costs, we show that the probability of survival increases with the ratio of sunk to fixed costs and
is insensitive to constant profitability shifters that are firm- and market-specific. We also show that the
magnitude of fixed costs does not affect the probability of survival if sunk costs are zero. We extend the
model to allow for interdependence across markets due to the effect of experience on both exporting costs.
We find that when sunk costs are interdependent, experienced exporters survive less, while the result is
ambiguous in the case of interdependent fixed costs.
In addition to our theoretical results, we uncover two basic facts: export survival rates upon entry
are lower in distant markets and higher for experienced exporters. Using these observed patterns and the
theoretical predictions of our model, we infer that fixed costs increase with distance proportionally more
than sunk costs. Also, the impact of experience on fixed costs dominates the impact on sunk costs. The
implications for distance are confirmed when we posit a linear relationship between distance and the ratio
of sunk to fixed costs and use the model to structurally estimate the parameters of this relationship. As
expected, the estimation results indicate that this relationship is negative. The results also indicate that
sunk costs are relatively small. In particular, in a counterfactual exercise we find that removing those costs
would increase aggregate exports by at most 1%. We conduct additional counterfactual experiments to study
the response of the economy to fixed costs and trade liberalization shocks. Our estimates imply the economy
converges very quickly to the new steady state across all distances. This suggests that, at our estimated
level of sunk-to-fixed cost ratio, the model does not generate a significant difference between the long-run
and the short-run trade elasticities.
The results of our paper carry potentially important implications for the quantitative literature on sunk
and fixed exporting costs. In particular, Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) and Morales, Sheu, and Zahler
(2014) find that sunk costs are substantially higher than fixed costs. Our findings suggests that existing
estimates of exporting costs may need to be re-evaluated in light of their ability to explain survival patterns
across distance and export experience.
We propose an interpretation of sunk costs as a stock of export associated activities that depreciates over
time while fixed costs are the activities required to restore the depreciated stock. Under this interpretation,
our results suggest that the stock of export activities depreciates more rapidly in more distant countries and
for less experienced firms. Although we believe this to be is a plausible description of exporting costs, we
have no direct evidence of our suggested interpretation. Understanding the exact nature of exporting costs
is an open question to which we hope the empirical literature will soon provide an answer.
We have studied theoretical determinants of the probability of survival upon entry confining ourselves
to what we believe is the most parsimonious dynamic model that is relevant for the study of this phe-
nomenon. The theoretical and empirical implications that we have derived are certainly dependent on the
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specific features of this model. This model could be extended to include additional features such as learning
about country-specific uncertainty (Albornoz, Calvo Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas, 2012), network formation
(Chaney, 2014) or reputation (Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas, 2014). We leave this task for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We will first characterize the function Gk(θ˜k). Take the derivative of Gk(θ˜k),
G′k(θ˜k) = β2
(
β1
υ
− β1 − 1
υ − α
)
θ˜β2−1k +
β1 − 1
υ − α ;
Take the second derivative. Since β2 < 0 and
β1
υ − β1−1υ−α > 0 (see section 2), we can establish that Gk(θ˜k) is
strictly convex:
G′′k(θ˜k) = β2(β2 − 1)
(
β1
υ
− β1 − 1
υ − α
)
θ˜β2−2k > 0.
Next, evaluate Gk(θ˜k) and G
′(θ˜k) at θ˜k = 1. Using (1):
Gk (1) =
(
β1
υ
− β1 − 1
υ − α
)
+
(β1 − 1)
υ − α − β1
(
1
υ
+
Sk
Fk
)
= −β1 Sk
Fk
≤ 0, (8)
with strict inequality if Sk > 0. Furthermore,
G′k(1) =
β2β1
υ
− (β2 − 1) β1 − 1
υ − α
=
(
β2β1
υ
−
(
β2β1 − β2 − β1 + 1
υ − α
))
= (β2β1 (υ − α)− υβ2β1 + υβ2 + υβ1 − υ)
= (−αβ2β1 + υ(β2 + β1 − 1))
= −α
(
−2υ
σ2
)
− υ 2α
σ2
= 0.
Since G′k(1) = 0 and the function is strictly convex, G
′
k(θ˜k) > 0 for θ˜k > 1. In fact Gk(θ˜k)→∞ as θ˜k →∞.
Since Gk(1) ≤ 0 and Gk(θ˜k) is continuous and strictly convex, it follows that there is a unique θ˜∗k ≥ 1
such that (1) holds. Finally, it follows immediately from (8) that θ˜∗k = 1 iff Sk = 0.
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A.2 Estimation procedure in Section 4
A.2.1 Estimation of SkFk
We estimate SkFk for each market k using the GMM estimator. We first specify a log-linear relation between
Sk
Fk
and distance:,
Sk
Fk
= ς0 + ς1 ln dk. (9)
Then, using equation (3) in the main text, the model delivers a prediction for the probability of survival
at horizon T = 2 for an arbitrary market at distance dk. Let yi denote whether incursion i survived and
P (di; ς0, ς1) denote the theoretical prediction on the probability of survival when
Sk
Fk
is given by (9). Then,
the residual εi is given by
εi = yi − P (di; ς0, ς0) .
We postulate the moment conditions:
E [x′iεi] = 0
where xi = [1, di]
′
. Let H denote the set of all {ς0, ς1} such that SkFk is nonnegative for all potential distances
in our database. Then, the GMM estimator solves
min
{ς0,ς1}∈H
QN (ς0, ς1) =
{
1
N
∑
x′iεi (ς0, ς1)
}′
W
{
1
N
∑
x′iεi (ς0, ς1)
}
where W is a weighting matrix. In a first stage, we set W to be the identity matrix. To compute the
standard errors, we cluster errors at the firm level to take into account that shocks may be correlated across
destinations,
Λˆ =
∑
i
∑
m
∑
m′
gˆ (yim, xim; ς0, ς1) gˆ (yim′ , xim′ ; ς0, ς1)
′
We then set W = Λˆ
−1
and re-estimate the coefficients ς = {ς0, ς1}.36 Finally, the asymptotic variance is
computed as
Avar =
1
N

(∑
i
∑
m
(
∂gim
∂ς
|ςˆ
))−1′
Λˆ−1
(∑
i
∑
m
(
∂gim
∂ς
|ςˆ
))−1
A.2.2 Estimation of θ˜k0
We specify a linear relation between θ˜k0 and distance in logarithms:
ln θ˜k0 = η0 + η1 ln dk.
36Although the model is just-identified, we find that the nonnegativity constraint binds so the choice ofW becomes relevant.
In any event, the results only change slightly between stages 1 and 2.
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Then, using equation (5) in the main text, the model delivers a prediction for the share of exporting firms
for an arbitrary market at distance dk. Let yk denote the observed share of exporting firms in market k and
χk (dk; η0, η1) denote the theoretical prediction on this share. Then, the residual εk is given by
εk = yk − χk (dk; η0, η1) .
In this case, the moment conditions are
E [x′kεk] = 0
where xk = [1, ln (dk)]
′
. Since the model is just-identified we solve
∑
x′kεk (η0, η1) = 0. We finally compute
the asymptotic variance allowing for heteroskedascity.37
A.3 Proofs in section 4.2
Proof that the cross-sectional distribution of (normalized) profitability θ˜kt is a double
Pareto. We know ln θ˜kt ∼ N(ln θ˜k0 + µt;σ2t). To find the stationary distribution, we only need to ac-
cumulate the probability distributions at each point in a firm’s “history” since each represents a different
cohort of firms. This yields:
f
(
ln θ˜k
)
=
∫ ∞
0
gBe
−gBt 1
σ
√
t
φ
(
ln θ˜kt − ln θ˜k0 − µt
σ
√
t
)
dt. (10)
Solving this integral yields the expression (4) in the main text (see Reed 2001 for a proof).
Next, let h1
(
ln θ˜k, t
)
denote the measure of firms that have already paid the sunk cost and satisfy
ln θ˜kt = ln θ˜k. Noting that ln θ˜kt ∼ N(ln θ˜∗k + µ (t− τ) ;σ2 (t− τ)) for any t > τ , where τ is the time of first
entry, we can write h1 as follows,
h1
(
ln θ˜k, t
)
=
∫ t
0
1
σ
√
t− sφ
(
ln θ˜k − ln θ˜∗k − µ (t− s)
σ
√
t− s
)
Pr {τ = s} ds
Then,
∫ ∞
0
gBe
−gBth1
(
ln θ˜k, t
)
dt =
∫ ∞
0
gBe
−gBt
{∫ t
0
1
σ
√
t− sφ
(
ln θ˜k − ln θ˜∗k − µ (t− s)
σ
√
t− s
)
Pr {τ = s} ds
}
dt
Using Foubini to interchange integrals,
∫ ∞
0
gBe
−gBth1
(
ln θ˜k, t
)
dt =
∫ ∞
0
gBe
−gBs
{∫ ∞
s
e−gB(t−s)
1
σ
√
t− sφ
(
ln θ˜k − ln θ˜∗k − µ (t− s)
σ
√
t− s
)
dt
}
Pr {τ = s} ds
37Thus, the formula is a special case of the one considered in the sunk-cost estimation. Here, we do not need to cluster at
the market level because we only use one observation per market.
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Since the inside term does not depend on s this simplifies to
∫ ∞
0
gBe
−gBth1
(
ln θ˜k, t
)
dt =
(∫ ∞
0
e−gBs Pr {τ = s} ds
)(∫ ∞
0
gBe
−gBt 1
σ
√
t
φ
(
ln θ˜k − ln θ˜∗k − µt
σ
√
t
)
dt
)
.
The second term in parenthesis coincides with (10) except that we have θ˜∗k instead of θ˜k0. To transform∫∞
0
gBe
−gBth1
(
ln θ˜k, t
)
dt into a probability measure we need to divide by
∫∞
0
e−gBs Pr {τ = s} ds. Then,
using the same result as before with θ˜∗k instead of θ˜k0, we obtain
f1
(
θ˜k
)
=
 r1r2r1+r2 θ˜
r1−1
k θ˜
∗−r1
k if θ˜k < θ˜
∗
k
r1r2
r1+r2
θ˜−r2−1k θ˜
∗r2
k if θ˜k ≥ θ˜∗k
 . (11)
Note that the distribution of exporters is this distribution truncated at θ˜k = 1.
Proof that the entry rate into k is given by MktMt =
{
1− r2r1+r2 θ˜
∗−r1
k
}(
θ˜k0
θ˜∗k
)r2
. Our results on f1
imply that the share of these firms that are exporting at any given point in time
Mxτ
Mτ
is given by
Mxτ
Mτ
=
r1r2
r1 + r2
{∫ ln θ˜∗k
0
er1(ln θ˜k−ln θ˜
∗
k)d ln θ˜k +
∫ ∞
ln θ˜∗k
e−r2(ln θ˜k−ln θ˜
∗
k)d ln θ˜k
}
= 1− r2
r1 + r2
θ˜∗−r1k .
To find the total mass of exporters, we just need to integrate across all potential ”entry cohorts”,
Mx
M
=
∫ ∞
0
e−gBt
Mxτ
Mτ
Pr (τ = t) dt
=
{
1− r2
r1 + r2
θ˜∗−r1k
}(
θ˜k0
θ˜∗k
)r2
,
where we used the following result on discounted stopping times (see Stokey (2008, Ch. 5)),
∫ ∞
0
e−gBt Pr (τ = s) dt =
(
θ˜k0
θ˜∗k
)r2
.
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A.4 Counterfactual
Aggregate exports (per firm) in the initial steady state are given by
(
X
M
)I
k
= Fk
r1r2
r1 + r2
{∫ ln θ˜∗k
0
θ˜er1(ln θ˜−ln θ˜
∗
k)d ln θ˜ +
∫ ∞
ln θ˜∗k
θ˜e−r2(ln θ˜−ln θ˜
∗
k)d ln θ˜
}(
θ˜k0
θ˜∗k
)r2
= Fk
r1r2
r1 + r2
{∫ θ˜∗k
1
(
θ˜
θ˜∗k
)r1dθ˜ +
∫ ∞
θ˜∗k
(
θ˜
θ˜∗k
)−r2dθ˜
}(
θ˜k0
θ˜∗k
)r2
= θ˜r2k0Fk
r1r2
r1 + r2
{
1
r1 + 1
(θ˜∗1−r2k − θ˜∗−(r1+r2)k ) +
1
r2 − 1 θ˜
∗1−r2
k
}
.
First, consider aggregate exports in a new steady state with no sunk costs. Firms are still born with the
same normalized profitability but now θ˜∗k = 1. Hence aggregate exports in the new steady state are given by
(
X
M
)S
k
= θ˜r2k0Fk
r1r2
r1 + r2
1
r2 − 1 .
Thus, this policy increases exports by
(
X
M
)S
k(
X
M
)I
k
=
1
r2−1
1
r1+1
(θ˜∗1−r2k − θ˜∗−(r1+r2)k ) + 1r2−1 θ˜
∗1−r2
k
.
Second, consider aggregate exports in a new steady state with the old sunk cost but with a proportional
reduction of fixed costs, i.e. F ′k = (1− τF )Fk with τF ∈ (0, 1). Let θˆ ≡ (1− τF )−1 θ˜ denote profitability
normalized by the new fixed costs. Furthermore, let θˆ∗ denote the new normalized threshold. Note θˆ∗ > θ˜∗
since now
(
Sk
Fk
)′
is higher. Hence aggregate exports in the new steady state are given by
(
X
M
)F
k
= (1− τF )1−r2 θ˜r2k0Fk
r1r2
r1 + r2
{
1
r1 + 1
(θˆ∗1−r2k − θˆ∗−(r1+r2)k ) +
1
r2 − 1 θˆ
∗1−r2
k
}
.
Third, consider aggregate exports in a new steady state with the old sunk and fixed cost but with a
decrease in the tariff charged by the foreign government of market k. In a CES-monopolistic competition
framework, this increases potential sales to (1− τU )−ε θ˜kt, where ε is the elasticity of substitution across
varieties and τU is the proportional reduction in the tariff. Let θ¯kt ≡ (1− τU )−ε θ˜kt. Note that, in terms of
θ¯, the new steady state distribution is the same as the old one with θ˜ except that now θ¯k0 = (1− τU )−ε θ˜k0.
In fact, this is just a special case of our result for ψk: thresholds are proportional to multiplicative shifters
so θ˜∗ = θ¯∗. Thus, aggregate exports in the new steady state are
(
X
M
)U
k
= (1− τU )−εr2 θ˜r2k0Fk
r1r2
r1 + r2
{
1
r1 + 1
(θ˜∗1−r2k − θ˜∗−(r1+r2)k ) +
1
r2 − 1 θ˜
∗1−r2
k
}
.
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In our counterfactual we pick τF and τU such that
(
X
M
)S
k
=
(
X
M
)F
k
=
(
X
M
)U
k
,
(1− τF )1−r2
{
1
r1 + 1
(θˆ∗1−r2k − θˆ∗−(r1+r2)k ) +
1
r2 − 1 θˆ
∗1−r2
k
}
=
1
r2 − 1
(1− τU )−εr2
{
1
r1 + 1
(θ˜∗1−r2k − θ˜∗−(r1+r2)k ) +
1
r2 − 1 θ˜
∗1−r2
k
}
=
1
r2 − 1 .
Furthermore, we simulate the transitional dynamics following the approach described in Online Appendix 3.
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A.5 Survival and Gravities, Robustness
Table A.1: Survival and Gravities, Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pikt Pikt P
2CY
ikt P
3Y
ikt Pikt Pikt Piktp
Estimation Method OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ln dk -0.034*** -0.067*** -0.02*** -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.045***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
† † [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008]
Common Languagek 0.027*** 0.074** 0.027** 0.021* 0.024* 0.016 0.023
(0.005) (0.036) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017)
† † [0.01] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.016]
Contiguityk 0.058*** -0.032 -0.006 -0.021 -0.022* -0.005 -0.032**
(0.007) (0.036) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013)
† † [0.014] [0.035] [0.012] [0.018] [0.013]
Constant 0.511*** 0.095 0.42*** 0.383*** 0.518*** 0.545*** 0.669***
(0.036) (0.178) (0.068) (0.057) (0.08) (0.078) (0.079)
† † [0.064] [0.084] [0.078] [0.072] [0.077]
Year FE : yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE : yes no no no no no no
Sample : 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2004 1998-2004 1995-2004 1995-2004
excluding manufacturing
2000-2002 goods
Observations 118,776 118,776 118,776 118,776 81,258 87,308 153,322
R-squared 0.386 0.001 0.007 0.044 0.006 0.009 0.011
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the destination level
Robust standard errors in brackets clustered (two-way) by firm and destination
†Two-way clustering by firm and destination cannot be performed
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Pikt: Probability of establishing an export experience that is active for 2 years
after an incursion of firm i in market k in period t
P 2CYikt : Probability of establishing an export experience that is active 2 consecutive years
after an incursion of firm i in market k in period t
P 3Yikt : Probability of establishing an export experience that is active 3 years
after an incursion of firm i in market k in period t
P 3Yiktp: Probability of establishing an export experience that is active 3 years
after an incursion of firm i in market k in period t of product p
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